The study analyses the economic consequences of changes in the local bank presence.
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 changed the global banking landscape. Banks hit by the crisis were nationalized or forced to merge or significantly restructure their activities. Both firms and citizens experienced the repercussions of those changes. The impact of the financial crisis on bank relationships and credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been widely addressed in the literature. Researchers used both country-level data (for example, Berger, Cerqueiro, and Fabias Penas, 2015 , for the USA; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013, for France; Tsurata, 2015, for Japan) and cross-country data (for example, Popov and Udell, 2012 for 14 Central and Eastern European countries). The regional and local effects of the crisis, including changes in the banking markets, attracted, so far, less attention. Our study tries to fill in this gap in the literature.
To examine the local repercussions of crisis-induced modifications in the banking sector, we use data from Poland from 2009 to 2014. We focus on three types of changes in the local bank presence. First, we study the dynamics of bank branch networks within local banking markets. Second, we investigate the changes in the number of banks. Finally, we analyse the modifications of bank ownership structures within local banking markets. We investigate local changes at the county level 1 . We assess the effects of instability in local banking markets from the perspective of local economic activity and firms' performance. Consequently, our dataset combines information on a county's economic situation, local firms' financial characteristics, and bank branch locations.
When studying the impact of changes in the local bank presence on economic activity and firms' performance, an endogeneity problem arises. On the one hand, the modifications in the number and structure of banks or branches within a county may influence local economic 1 We provide more information on counties in Poland in Section 3.
indicators and companies' performance. On the other hand, banks' decisions to enter or exit local banking markets depend, to some extent, on the local economic situation and local firms'
perspectives. Therefore, in this study, we use the GMM-SYS style estimation to address the endogeneity concerns directly.
In general terms, our empirical evidence indicates that different types of instability in the local bank presence have measurable economic repercussions. We find that bank branch expansion, regardless of the bank type, exerted a positive and direct influence on the local labour market. In line with the previous findings by Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, Kozłowski (2014) , we show that changes that strengthen the position of local cooperative banks and presumably privilege the use of the relationship banking model had positive consequences not only on employment but also on SMEs' access to debt and investment. In contrast, the increase in the number of large commercial banks within local markets, that probably stimulates the application of the transactional banking model, was associated with slower long-term debt growth for SMEs. The increased competition associated to a larger number of banks present in local banking markets lowered the financial costs incurred by SMEs. Only the appearance of new, usually stronger, more aggressive owners of large commercial banks stimulated the firm creation process. Young companies demonstrated to be more sensitive to the instability of local banking markets than mature firms. For example, the negative influence of large commercial banks' entries on the long-term debt growth ratios was stronger for SMEs that were established in the previous five years. However, the same group of SMEs benefited the most from the increased number of cooperative banks within a county in terms of reduced financial costs.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three aspects. First, we use a unique dataset that allows us to trace different types of changes in the local bank presence and to assess their influence on local economic activity in the post-crisis period. Second, our study adds to the relatively small number of studies that address SMEs' performance drivers in emerging economies, in general, and in Central European (CE) countries in particular. Third, and most importantly, we document that changes in the local bank presence are an additional, independent, statistically significant, and economically relevant factor that shapes local economic activity and the performance of local firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and formulate our research hypotheses. In Section 3, we present our empirical strategy, data, and econometric models. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 reports the concluding remarks and policy implications.
Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
There are three main strands in the banking literature related to our research: branching deregulation, relationship lending, and the effects of bank consolidation on SME lending. We briefly review the existing literature and introduce four hypotheses regarding the consequences of the instability of local banking markets on local economic activity and SMEs' performance.
The first strand of the literature concentrates on the positive effects of deregulation of branching laws on the banking industry and the economy. Most studies focus on the USA, where, from the 1970s through the 1990s, some states have removed restrictions on intrastate branching. In this respect, the USA provided an ideal ground for testing the effects of the intensified bank competition. Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) report that the banking industry became significantly more efficient after the deregulation of the intrastate branching. They find that the state averages for operating expenses and loan losses fell, and that much of these improvements were passed on to borrowers in the form of lower interest rates. Rice and Strahan (2010) confirm that the cost of credit is lower in states that are open to interstate branching.
Moreover, they show that small firms are more likely to borrow from banks where branching is less restricted. Strahan (2003) provides a comprehensive review of the available evidence in favour of the benefits of deregulation.
In addition, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that GDP and income growth rates increased in the deregulated states. Beck, Levine, Levkov (2010) provided an evaluation of the impact of branch deregulation on the distribution of income in the US economy. They report that removing restrictions on intrastate bank branching reduced inequality by boosting incomes in the lower portion of the income distribution. They suggest three possible channels linking bank performance and income distribution. The first is related to studies showing that credit market imperfections prevent the poor from borrowing to invest more in education, which hinders their access to higher paying jobs (Galor and Zeira, 1993) . The second explanation is based on the results of Benerjee and Newman (1993) and focuses on the ability of the poor to become entrepreneurs. The last reason relies on the response of companies to lower interest rates, which encourage firms to substitute capital for labour. Consequently, we assume that the development of local bank branch networks positively affects local economic activity, both directly, through job creation, and indirectly, through factors related to the intensified competition and the improvement of lending conditions. However, the opposite effect, particularly in the case of the local labour market, is also conceivable as the increased competition may also force banks to lay off workers and the improved access to bank loans may encourage firms to invest in less labour-intensive technologies. Therefore, we verify the following hypothesis:
H1: The development of local bank branch networks is beneficial to the overall economic activity, in particular to the local labour market.
The second strand of the literature concentrates on relationship banking. The existing theoretical and empirical research suggests that small local banks may have an advantage in providing loans to SMEs. The benefit may result from relationship lending, which is characterized by close monitoring, re-negotiability, and lengthy contractual agreements (Berlin and Mester, 1998) . DeYoung (2002) argues that community banks have a comparative advantage over larger banks in forming relationships with lenders, as they have permanent contact with local economic players. They may also base the loan granting process on information about the prospects of the local economy. Ergungor and Moulton (2011) document that the presence of a bank in local markets improves its credit quality assessment process. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) show that building a close relationship with lenders results in a larger availability of credit. Additionally, Berger and Udell (1995) find that small firms with longer bank relationships pay lower interest rates and are required to provide less collateral. Berger and Udell (2002) show that large banks are less likely to extend credit to small businesses, especially to small firms with no credit history. Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, Stein (2005) add that large banks are not keen on small business lending, which relies heavily on soft information. In contrast, large banks prefer to lend to large firms that have welldocumented track records. Large banks may also be objectively disadvantaged in this respect, as their headquartered are often located at a substantial distance from potential small business borrowers. Strahan and Weston (1998) confirm that the presence of large banks has an adverse effect on small business growth. They also show that small business lending increases with banks growth for a while, but when a bank gets larger, lending to large firms increases dramatically. Finally, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) underline that the geographical proximity between bank branches and clients facilitates the gathering of soft information, reducing problems related to asymmetric information.
Although several studies document that large banks have an informational disadvantage in making loans to small business, the recent research shows that such banks have been using hard information-based technologies to evaluate credit application of small firms. Berger and Black (2011) find that lending techniques based on hard information guarantee a comparative advantage to large banks in lending to both small and large firms, but not to the medium-sized companies. Nevertheless, most part of the literature supports the view that small banks have a comparative advantage in lending to SMEs. As a consequence, we conjecture that changes in the local bank presence that boost relationship banking and privilege the use of soft information within local banking markets have a positive impact on local economic activity. Therefore, we introduce the following hypothesis:
H2: The relative strengthening of small local banks improves the local economic situation.
The third strand of the relevant literature concentrates on the impact of bank consolidation on the credit availability for small businesses. The effect of consolidation on bank lending terms is a widely researched topic. Gilbert (1984) and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) present an excellent literature review. A bank merger and acquisition (M&A) process involves changes in ownership, strategy, and bank focus. Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Strahan and Weston (1998) find that M&As between small banks increase small business lending, whereas consolidation between large banks tends to influence small business lending negatively. Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998) (2015) find a positive and significant relation between the credit supplied by rural banking institutions and small business development. Berger et al. (2015b) show that a strong presence of small banks yields to a much higher lending to start-ups in the US during normal times. In addition, they also find that a greater presence of small banks has a small positive impact on the failure rate of small opaque firms during normal times. Those effects were, however, reversed during the financial crisis of 2008, suggesting that small banks were not able to exploit their competitive advantage over large banks during a crisis period.
These results confirm that the links between young firms and banks are of particular importance. Moreover, those relationships are weak when their duration is short. For these reasons, we believe that the performance of young SMEs is more sensitive to different forms of instability within local banking markets compared to large companies. Therefore, we introduce the following hypothesis:
H4: The access to bank loans and investments of young SMEs is more sensitive to changes in the local bank presence compared to mature firms.
Empirical strategy, Data, and Models
In this section, we provide a general description of our empirical strategy. We also characterize the different data sources used in this study and we describe the construction of the dynamic panel models.
The Level of the Analysis
We examine changes in local banking markets and their impact on the local economic situation and SMEs' performance at the county level. Presbitero, Udell, and Zazzaro (2014) show that the vast majority of loans are contracted locally. Therefore, the 17 voivodships in
Poland are too large units of the administrative division to study the economic phenomena of interest.
Specificity of the Polish Banking System
The Polish banking system is characterized by two groups of banks that compete locally.
These groups differ substantially in their business model, organizational form, and size of operations. The first group of banks-the so-called commercial banks-includes large, distantly managed banks with nationwide branch networks, organized as joint-stock companies, state enterprises, or branches of foreign credit institutions. The second group comprises cooperative banks only, which are small local organizations covering at best several counties.
According to data published by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority, 626 cooperative banks controlled almost 7% of the banking sector assets at the end of 2015, while 65 commercial banks were in charge of the remaining assets. However, cooperative banks offered their services through 4,200 branches, almost 30% of all bank branches in Poland. In the Polish banking sector, most commercial banks were foreign-owned. The bank assets controlled by foreign investors amounted to around 70% during the period of study. Popov and Udell (2012) find strong evidence for the international transmission of financial distress during the financial crisis of 2008, which resulted in a credit reduction for SMEs. In contrast, Allen, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, and Kozlowski (2015) show that, during the recent crisis, state-owned banks increased lending in Central European countries. Let us recall that small local banks also have a comparative advantage in producing soft information (Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger, Bouwman, and Kim, 2015; Liberti and Mian, 2009; Stein, 2002) and apply the relationship banking model (Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al., 2005; De Haas, Ferreira, Taci, 2010; Uchida. Udell, and Watanabe, 2008) . Therefore, we conjecture that cooperative banks in Poland may play a disproportionately important role in shaping local economic activity in comparison to their modest share in banking sector assets, particularly after the crisis. For this reason, in our investigation, we differentiate between commercial banks and cooperative banks.
An Overview of the Research Strategy
As Figure 1 shows, the definition of a local banking market constitutes our starting point. We assume that county borders define local banking markets. We distinguish three sources of instability within local banking: the development of bank branch networks, bank entries to and exits from local banking markets, and significant modifications in the ownership structure of banks. We analyse the consequences of each type of instability for commercial and cooperative banks separately. We assess the influence of changes in the local bank presence on local economic activity and on the financial conditions of SMEs in a given county. With respect to local economic activity, we focus on unemployment growth and new firm creation, while concerning SMEs' outcomes; we focus on long-term debt growth, financial costs, and investments. Finally, we confront our research hypotheses, H1 to H4, with the empirical evidence.
[ Figure 1 here]
Data Sources
Our research definition of Eurostat 4 and we excluded all companies that did not meet these criteria in at least one year within the analysed period. We also restricted our sample to companies from sections A-C and F-I of the NACE Rev. 2 industry classification. Therefore, we excluded the following sectors: financial institutions; utilities; industries dominated by the public sector; professional, scientific, technical, and administrative activities; and other industries that usually do not rely on bank loans as an important source of financing. We end up with a final sample of approximately 40 thousand companies 5 .
Econometric Models

Local Economic Condition
To study the impact of banking market instability on the local economy, we estimate a set of panel estimation models using county-year observations. We regress local economic
condition (COUNTY.DEP) against different measures of banking market instability (INSTB)
and we could expect some feedback from COUNTY.DEP to INSTB, at least in case of some instability measures. In other words, we conjecture that banks could enter or exit from local markets if the local economic condition is good or poor, respectively. To address this potential endogeneity problem, we apply the GMM-SYS estimation procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . In contrast with other panel estimators (such as the fixed effects or random effects estimators), the GMM-SYS removes the strict exogeneity assumption for some regressors. This allows us to include in the regression analysis potentially endogenous variables, as well as the lagged dependent variable to control for the time persistence of local economic condition. We allow the lagged dependent variable to be only sequentially exogenous, while we assume that 4 Thus, SMEs are defined as employing fewer than 250 persons and having an annual turnover of as much as EUR 50 million, or a balance sheet total of no more than EUR 43 million. Simulations performed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that the asymptotic standard errors for the two-step estimator can be a poor guide to hypothesis testing, especially in the presence of heteroscedastic errors. Therefore, we base our statistical inference on the one-step estimator. We formally evaluate the appropriateness of the set of instruments with the Hansen test, and we also check whether undesired instrument proliferation weakens the Hansen test, potentially generating the implausibly high p-value of 1 (Roodman, 2006) . Panels A and B in Table 1 specify the construction of all county-level dependent variables and control variables, as well as the regressors describing the local banking market instability. Panels A and B in Table 2 report the descriptive statistics for our final sample of county-year observations.
[ Table 1 here]
[ Table 2 here]
Local Firms' Outcomes
To examine the impact of local banking market instability on already established SMEs, we apply the GMM-SYS procedure to dynamic panel models using a dataset composed of firmyear observations. Equation (2) illustrates the general construction of the models: (2) where SME.DEPikt denotes long-term debt growth (DEBT.GR) and financial costs (FIN.COST) or investments (INVEST) of firm i, in county k in year t; SME.CTRLikt-1 is a set of control variables describing SMEs' size (LNA), asset turnover (TAT), asset structure (CASH, COLLAT, FIXA), profitability (ROS, EBIT.S), and shareholders' capital and leverage (EQUITY, LT.LIAB) 6 . LOCAL.CTRLkt and INSTBkt-1 are defined in the same way as in Equation (1 Table 2 reports the corresponding descriptive statistics.
Results
We organize the presentation of our research outcomes according to the type of modifications in the local bank presence, as described in the previous sections. Therefore, in sub-section 4.1, we concentrate on changes in the number of bank branches, in sub-section 4.2 we focus on banks' entries to and exits from local banking markets and, finally, in sub-section 4.3, on the changes in the ownership structure of banks. Sub-section 4.4 constitutes the only exception to this rule, as in this sub-section we check the robustness of our findings in the case of relatively young local firms. Table 3 shows that changes in branch networks within counties affect the unemployment dynamics (specifications 1 and 2), but do not influence the creation of new companies (specifications 3 and 4). Regardless of the bank type, increases in the local presence are associated with positive tendencies on the labour market: the coefficients for the variables 7 While constructing industry dummies, we took into account the number of observations for each industry, and we grouped the industries into 17 groups. Each section of the NACE Rev 2 classification constitutes a separate industry bucket except for manufacturing, within which we identified 10 industry groups, and the wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, within which we identified two separate industry groups.
Developments in Local Branch Networks
BRANCH. COOP.INCR and BRANCH.CB.INC in specification (2) are both negative and statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. The identified relationships are also relevant in economic terms. Specification (2) implies that increases of one standard deviation in the number of cooperative and commercial bank branches lead to the reduction in the unemployment growth ratio by 11.3% and 38% of this growth ratio standard deviation, respectively. Therefore, our results support H1 with respect to the local labour market.
County-level control variables influence the dependent variables predominantly in the expected directions, as shown in Table 3 . The counties with a better-educated population (GRADUATES) are characterized by more favourable tendencies on the labour market (specification 1) and a more rapid pace of new firm creation (specification 3 and 4). Higher population density (POP.DENS) is positively related to start-up activity, while wide profit margins of local companies (MEAN.ROS) seem to be, at least partially, achieved through layoffs. The elevated local banking market concentration (HHI) inhibits new firm creation (specification 4) and, rather surprisingly, influences positively the county labour markets.
[ Table 3 here]
In Table 4 , we report how changes in local bank branch networks affect the performance of SMEs. In contrast with H1, the studied factor is almost irrelevant to SMEs' outcomes. We obtain only weak evidence that an increase in the presence of cooperative banks within counties is favourable for SMEs' access to debt and investment. Namely, the coefficients for the variable BRANCH.COOP.INCR are positive and significant in specifications (2) and (6), but only at the 10% level. Moreover, the impact of cooperative bank branch network development is only moderately significant in economic terms. Specifications (2) and (6) indicate that the rise in the number of cooperative bank branches by one standard deviation in the same county where an SME is established results in the long term debt and tangible fixed assets growth ratios higher by 0.1 and 0.4 of a percentage point, respectively.
Firm-level control variables mostly impact the dependent variables in the predictable directions, as reported in Table 4 . The large size of operations (LNA), significant cash holdings (CASH), and more rapid asset turnover (TAT) seem related to a quicker pace of long-term debt growth, lower financial costs, and higher investments. Firms that already possess a significant long-term debt (LT.LIAB) record its slower growth rates and invest less. A solid equity capital base (EQUITY) improves the terms of debt contracting, while sizeable fixed assets (FIX.A) restrain investments. Good sales profitability (ROS or EBIT.S) facilitate long-term debt growth and investments. However, unexpectedly, high returns on sales ratios are positively associated with higher SMEs' financial costs.
[ Table 4 here]
In sum, we believe that the positive relationship between local bank branch development and county labour markets reflects the direct impact of this type of change in local bank presence on local economic situation through the influence of new jobs creation. There are three reasons behind our conclusion. First and most importantly, Table 4 provides only weak evidence that the modifications in local bank branch networks affect SMEs' performance.
Second, as Table 3 documents, a larger number of branches do not translate into higher startup activity. Third, as shown in Table 3 , we obtain negative and statistically significant 
Banks Entries to and Exits from Local Markets
In this sub-section, we investigate the consequences of banks' entries to and exits from local markets. Table 5 reports the results of the county-level analysis and Table 6 presents the outcomes of the firm-level analysis. In line with the findings reported in Table 3 , we establish that changes in the number of banks influence unemployment growth, but do not affect new firm creation. Specifications (2) and (10) in Table 5 suggest that the situation of the local labour market is more favourable when the number of cooperative banks increases, while it worsens when cooperative banks withdraw from a given county. However, as specification (6) is linked to a surge in the unemployment growth ratio of 104.5% of its standard deviation.
[ Table 5 here] At the firm level, our investigation reveals the most stable and significant empirical patterns in the analysis of financial costs incurred by SMEs. We find that increases in the number of banks, and entries of banks into local banking markets in particular, lower the costs of contracting bank debt, in line with Rice and Strahan (2010) . The coefficient for the variable BANKS.INCR in specification (3) and the variable ENTRIES in specification (9) are both negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, specifications (4) and (10) document that the influence of an increase in the number of banks on the FIN.COST variable is stronger for commercial banks with nationwide presence than for cooperative banks.
Specification (4) implies that the presence of one more cooperative bank and one more commercial bank in a county is associated with the reduction in the financial costs of an SME by 1% and 2% of the FIN.COST variable median in the sample, respectively. We conjecture that entries of large banks exert pressure on all banks present in a county to diminish their lending spreads. Concerning long-term debt growth ratios, specification (8) suggests that entries of cooperative banks are beneficial to SMEs. At the same time, specifications (2) and (8) [ Table 6 here]
The empirical evidence reported in Tables 5 and 6 support, at least to some extent, H2
and the existing evidence for the Polish market (Hasan et al., 2014) . We show that changes that favour the application of the relationship banking model and the use of soft information in the lending process are beneficial to the local economy. The increase in the number of cooperative banks reduces unemployment growth and stimulates long-term growth for SMEs. In contrast, exits of cooperative banks are linked to the worsening of the local labour market and lower investments of SMEs. In addition, a rise in the number of cooperative banks weakly lowers the financial costs reported by SMEs.
Changes in the Ownership Structure of Banks
Variations in the ownership structure of banks represent the third and final source of the instability in local banking markets that we analyse. Table 7 presents the results at the county level, while Table 8 reports the regressions' outcomes at the firm level. In contrast with subsections 4.1 and 4.2, the studied factor does not seem to affect unemployment growth ratios, but it influences the pace of new firm creation, as in study by Black and Strahan (2002) .
According to specifications (3) and (7) in Table 7 , the relatively high number of banks acquired by new entities is positively and significantly correlated with the NEW.COMP variable, at the 1% level. Contrary to the results reported by Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Strahan and Weston (1998) , specifications (4) and (8) suggest that this relationship is only driven by ownership changes in the group of commercial banks, characterized by nationwide branch networks. Specification (4) implies that, if a new owner acquires one of the commercial banks operating in a given country, this leads to an increase in the pace of new firm creation equivalent to 7.4% of the NEW.COMP variable standard deviation. Due to the post-crisis period specificity, we are inclined to explain the regularities identified in Table 7 by the fact that new owners of non-cooperative large banks are usually financially stronger and pursue more aggressive market strategies than their predecessors. As a consequence, commercial banks after fundamental changes in ownership structures became more willing to finance new firm creation. An alternative explanation relies on shifts in the lending behaviour of competitors within the same market, as suggested by Berger et al. (1998) .
[ Table 7 here]
The results on SMEs' performance reported in Table 8 When we consider the number of banks affected by ownership changes, the coefficients for the variables illustrating the instability within local markets (ACQ.BANK and ACQ.BANK.CB) are positive and significant. However, when we base our inferences on the number of bank branches affected by ownership changes, the coefficients for the ACQ.BRANCH and ACQ.BRANCH.CB variables become negative and significant. We offer two explanations for the puzzling results reported in Table 8 . First, the changes in ownership structures not only imply the arrival of new stronger owners, but also cause modifications in lending policies, which, in turn, may lead to distortions in banks' relations with customers. Therefore, the positive and negative (from the perspective of SMEs) effects of ownership changes in banks already present in local markets may offset each other. Second, the indicators of the instability caused by changes in ownership structures based on the number of branches exhibit, as Panel B in Table 2 documents, much more variability than the indicators relying on the numbers of banks. This difference may be responsible for the contradicting results concerning the determinants of SMEs' financial costs. In sum, we obtain weak evidence in favour of H3 because such proof only relates to one aspect of the local economic situation: the pace of new firm creation.
[ Table 8 here]
Changes in the Bank Local Presence and Firms' Age
Young firms usually have a smaller scale of operations and are more informationally opaque than mature companies. Therefore, young SMEs are more dependent on bank lending for financing investment projects and current activities. Moreover, banks are reluctant to lend to young SMEs because they can only show short credit histories and are frequently unable to pledge valuable collateral. Even when a new firm manages to establish a relationship with a bank, which helps overcome the problems related to the asymmetric information, strengthening this relationship requires a considerable time. As a consequence, from a theoretical perspective, young SMEs' outcomes should be more sensitive to changes in the local bank presence compared to other firms.
In Table 9 , we verify whether the positive and negative effects of instability within a county banking market are magnified in the case of young firms. To test H4, we introduce a binary variable, YOUNG, which identifies SMEs founded no more than 5 years ago, and we interact this variable with all previously used variables illustrating changes in the local bank presence. Our findings support H4 in the case of SMEs' long-term debt growth (Panel A in Table 9 ) and financial costs (Panel B in Table 9 ). In contrast, there is no evidence (Panel C in Table 9 ) that investments of young SMEs are more vulnerable to instability in local banking markets than mature firms.
As expected, young companies record faster growth of long-term debt, incur higher financial costs, and invest more. The coefficients for the variable YOUNG are all positive in Table 9 and mostly statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifications (1) and (3) confirm that the reinforcement of cooperative banks local presence improves SMEs' access to bank lending. In contrast, specification (3) suggests that entries of commercial banks are negatively correlated with long-term debt growth ratios of SMEs, in line with the findings reported in Table 6 . Therefore, specifications (1) and (3) provide additional evidence supporting H2. The negative impact of an increase in the number of commercial banks within a county banking market is particularly pronounced-in line with H4-for young firms: the coefficients of the relevant interaction terms are negative and statistically significant in specifications (2) and (3).
Panel B in Table 9 allows us to refine the conclusions formulated in sub-section 4.2.
Increases in the number of commercial banks or entries of such banks lower the financial costs for all SMEs (specifications 8 and 9), while increases in the number of cooperative banks or their entries only influence the dependent variable FIN.COST in the case of young firms. The results for ownership changes (specifications 11 and 12) remain ambiguous and method sensitive, as in sub-section 4.3. With regard to the investment activities of SMEs, Panel C in Table 9 provides only weak evidence (specification 16) that the exit of cooperative banks affects investments negatively and exits of commercial banks impact them positively. The age of the firms does not seem to modify the relationship between changes in the local bank presence and SMEs' investments, as all interaction terms in Panel C are statistically insignificant.
[ Table 9 here]
Concluding Remarks
In our study, we examined whether the instability of local banking markets influences local economic activity. The empirical evidence on Poland showed that selected changes in the local bank presence constitute an independent factor that affects local economic activity after controlling for its persistence, macroeconomic tendencies, banking market characteristics, demographic situation, industry specifics, firm-level factors, and factors related to local human capital.
We find that the situation of the local labour market is, on the one hand, positively affected by an increase in the number of commercial and cooperative bank branches, a rise in the number of cooperative banks, and entries of commercial banks. On the other hand, it seems negatively influenced by the exists of cooperative banks. The impact of these factors on the local labour market is most probably direct and is exerted through job creation, not through the condition of local firms. In contrast, the pace of new firm creation is dependent only on the appearance of new owners for locally present commercial banks. Our evidence suggests that the acquisition of commercial banks by usually stronger and more aggressive new owners after the 2008 crisis has facilitated the creation of new local firms.
With regard to SMEs' access to bank debt, we obtain evidence in line with the findings of DeYoung (2002) The increased competition, due to rising numbers of local players, seems to lower the financial costs incurred by SMEs. However, the evidence on the relation between changes in bank ownership structures and financial costs reported by local firms is inconclusive and method-sensitive. The influence of changes in the local bank presence is the weakest in the case of SME investment. We obtained only weak evidence that the increase in the number of cooperative bank branches favour investment, while the exits of cooperative banks act in the opposite direction.
Our study suggests some policy implications. First, policy-makers and regulatory bodies should not only consider nationwide consequences, but they may also focus on local effects when making decisions that influence the structure of the banking system. Second, small local banks seem to play an important and positive role in shaping local economic activity and the performance of local firms. Therefore, the regulatory approach to this kind of banking organizations should support them and help them preserve their financial soundness. Year-to-year increase in the number of banks, cooperative banks, and commercial banks, respectively, which operated in a given county*
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